This is the write-up of a set of lectures given at the Asia Europe Pacific School of High Energy Physics in Quy Nhon, Vietnam in September 2018, to an audience of PhD students in all branches of particle physics They cover the different meanings of 'probability', particularly frequentist and Bayesian, the binomial, Poisson and Gaussian distributions, hypothesis testing, estimation, errors (including asymmetric and systematic errors) and goodness of fit. Several different methods used in setting upper limits are explained, followed by a discussion on why 5 sigma are conventionally required for a 'discovery'.
Introduction
To interpret the results of your particle physics experiment and see what it implies for the relevant theoretical model and parameters, you need to use statistical techniques. These are a part of your experimental toolkit, and to extract the maximum information from your data you need to use the correct most powerful statistical tools.
Particle physics (like, probably, any field of science) has is own special set of statistical processes and language. Our use is in some ways more complicated (we often fit multi-parameter functions, not just straight lines) and in some ways more simple (we do not have to worry about ethics, or law suits). So the generic textbooks and courses you will meet on "Statistics" are not really appropriate. That's why HEP schools like this one include lectures on statistics as well as the fundamental real physics like Field Theory and BSM models.
There are several textbooks [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] available which are designed for an audience of particle physicists. You will find these helpful -more helpful than general statistical textbooks. You should find one whose language suits you and keep a copy on your bookshelf -preferably purchased, but at least on long term library loan. You will also find useful conference proceedings [7] [8] [9] , journal papers (particularly in Nuclear Instruments and Methods) and web material: often your own experiment will have a set of pages devoted to the topic.
Probability
We begin by looking at the concept of probability. Although this is familiar; we use it all the time, both inside and outside the laboratory, its use is not as obvious as you would think.
What is Probability?
A typical exam for Statistics101 (or equivalent) might well contain the question:
Q1
Explain what is meant by the Probability P A of an event A [1] The '1' in square brackets signifies that the answer carries one mark. That's an indication that just a sentence or two are required, not a long essay.
Asking a group of physicists this question produces answers falling into four different categories 1. P A is number obeying certain mathematical rules. 2. P A is a property of A that determines how often A happens 3. For N trials in which A occurs N A times, P A is the limit of N A /N for large N 4. P A is my belief that A will happen, measurable by seeing what odds I will accept in a bet.
Although all these are generally present, number 3 is the most common, perhaps because it is often explicitly taught as the definition. All are, in some way, correct! We consider each in turn.
Mathematical Probability
The Kolmogorov Axioms are: For all A ⊂ S P A ≥ 0 P S = 1 P A∪B = P A + P B if A ∩ B = φ and A, B ⊂ S (1) From these simple axioms a complete and complicated structure of theorems can be erected. This is what pure mathematicians do. For example, the 2nd and 3rd axiom show that the probability of not-A P A , is 1 − P A , and then the 1st axiom shows that P A ≤ 1: probabilities must be less than 1.
But the axioms and the ensuing theorems says nothing about what P A actually means. Kolmogorov had frequentist probability in mind, but these axioms apply to any definition: he explicitly avoids tying P A down in this way. So although this apparatus enables us to compute numbers, it does not tell us what we can use them for.
Real probability
Also known as Classical probability, this was developed during the 18th-19th century by Pascal, Laplace and others to serve the gambling industry.
If there are several possible outcomes and there is a symmetry between them so they are all, in a sense, identical, then their individual probabilities must be equal. For example, there are two sides to a coin, so if you toss is there must be a probability 1 2 for each face to land uppermost. Likewise there are 52 cards in a pack, so the probability of a particular card being chosen is 1 52 . In the same way there are 6 sides to a dice, and 33 slots in a roulette wheel, This enables you to answer questions like 'What is the probability of rolling more than 10 with 2 dice?'. There are 3 such combinations (5-6, 6-5 and 6-6) out of the 6 × 6 = 36 total possibilities, so the probability is 1 12 . Compound instances of A are broken down into smaller instances to which the symmetry argument can be applied. This is satisfactory and clearly applicable -you know that if someone offers you a 10 to 1 bet on this dice throw, you should refuse; in the long run knowledge of the correct probabilities will pay off.
The problem arises that this approach cannot be applied to continuous variables. This is brought out in Bertan's paradoxes, one of which runs:
In a circle of radius R an equilateral triangle is drawn. A chord is drawn at random. What is the probability that the length of the chord is greater than the side of the triangle?
Considering figure 1 one can give three answers:
1. If the chord, without loss of generality, starts at A, then it will be longer than the side if the end point is anywhere between B and C. So the answer is obviouslly 1 3 2. If the centre of the chord, without loss of generality, is chosen at random along the line OD, then it will be longer than the side of the triangle if it is in OE rather than ED. E is the midpoint of OD so the answer is obviously 1 2 . 3. If the centre of the chord, without loss of generality, is chosen at random within the circle, then it will be longer than the side of the triangle if it lies within the circle of radius So we have three obvious but contradictory answers. The whole question is built on a false premise: drawing a chord 'at random' is, unlike tossing a coin or throwing a dice, not defined. Another way of seeing this is that a distribution which is uniform in one variable , say θ, is not uniform in any non-trivial transformation of that variable, say cos θ or tan θ. Classical probability has therefore to be discarded.
Frequentist Probability
Because of such difficulties, Real Probability was replaced by Frequentist Probability in the early 20th century, This is the usual definition taught in schools and undergraduate classes. A very readable account is given by von Mises [10] . The probability of a coin landing heads up is 1 2 because if you toss a coin 1000 times, one side will come down ∼ 500 times. That is an empirical definition (Frequentist probability has roots in the Vienna school and logical positivism). Similarly the lifetime of a muon is 2.2µs because if you take 1000 muons and wait 2.2µs, then ∼ 368 (that's e −1 ) will remain.
With this definition P A is not just a property of A, but a joint property of A and the ensemble. The same coin will have a different probability for showing head depending on whether it is in a purse or in a numismatic collection. This leads to two distinctive properties (or, some would say, problems) for Frequentist Probability.
Firstly, there may be more than one ensemble. To take an everyday example from von Mises, German life insurance companies pay out on 0.4% of 40 year old male clients. Your friend Hans is 40 today. What is the probability that he will survive to see his 41st birthday? 99.6% is an answer (if he's insured) But he is also a non-smoker and non-drinker -so perhaps the figure is higher (maybe 99.8%)? But if he drives a Harley-Davidson it should be lower (maybe 99.0%)? All these numbers are acceptable. The individual Hans belongs to several different ensembles, and the probablility will be different for each of them
To take an example from physics, suppose your experiment has a Particle Identification (PID) system using Cherenkov, time-of-flight and/or dE dx measurements. You want to talk about the probability that a K + will be correctly recognised by your PID. You determine this by considering many K + mesons and counting the number accepted to get to get P = N acc /N tot . But these will depend on the kaon sample you work with. It could be all kaons, or kaons above a certain energy threshold, or that actually enter the detector. The ensemble can be defined in various ways, each giving a valid but different value for the probability.
On the other hand, there may be no Ensemble. To take an everyday example we might want to calculate the probability that it will rain tomorrow. This is impossible. There is only one tomorrow. It will either rain or not rain. P rain is either 0 or 1, and we won't know which until tomorrow gets here. Von Mises insists that statements like 'It will probably rain tomorrow.' are loose and unscientific.
To take an example from physics, consider the probability that there is a supersymmetric particle with mass below 2 TeV. Again, either there is or there isn't.
But, despite von Mises' objections, it does seem sensible, as the pressure falls and the gathering clouds turn grey, to say "It will probably rain.". So this is a drawback to the frequentist definition. We will return to this and show how frequentists can talk meaningfully and quantitatively about unique events in the discussion of confidence intervals in section 8.1.
Bayes' Theorem
Before presenting Bayesian statistics we need to discuss Bayes' theorem, though we point out that Bayes' Theorem applies (and is useful) in any probability model: it goes right back to the Kolmogorov axioms.
First we need to define the Conditional Probability: P (A|B): this is the probability for A, given that B is true. For example: if a playing card is drawn at random from a pack of 52, then P (♠A) = 1 52 but if you are told that the cards is black, then P (♠A|Black) = 1 26 . (And obviously P (♠A|Red) = 0.) Bayes' theorem is just
The proof is gratifyingly simple: the probabiilty that A and B are both true can be written in two ways P (A|B) × P (B) = P (A&B) = P (B|A) × P (A)
Throw away middle term and divide by P (B) to get the result.
As a first example, we go back to the ace of spades above. A card is drawn at random, and you are told that it is black. Bayes' theorem says
i.e. the original probability of drawing ♠A, 1 52 is multiplied by the probability that the ace of spades is black (just 1) and divided by the overall probability of drawing a black card ( 1 2 ) to give the obvious result.
For a less trivial example, suppose you have a momentum-selected beam which is 90% π and 10% K. This goes through a Cherenkov counter for which pions exceed the threshold velocity but kaons do not. In principle pions will give a signal, but suppose there is a 5% chance, due to inefficiencies, that they will not. Again in principle kaons always give no Cherenkov signal, but suppose that probability is only 95% due to background noise. What is the probability that a particle identified as a kaon, as it gave no signal, is truly one?
Bayes' theorem runs
showing that the probability is only Incidentally this uses the (often handy) expression for the denominator: P (B) = P (B|A) × P (A) + P (B|A) × P (A)
Bayesian Probability
The Bayesian definition of probability is that P A represents your belief in A. 1 represents certainty, 0 represents total disbelief. Intermediate values can be calibrated by asking whether you would prefer to bet on A, or on a white ball being drawn from an urn containing a mix of white and black balls.
This avoids the limitations of frequentist probability -coins, dice, kaons, rain tomorrow, existence of SUSY can all have probabilities assigned to them.
The drawback is that your value for P A may be different from mine, or anyone else's. It is also called subjective probability.
Bayesian Probability makes great use of Bayes' Theorem, in the form
P (T heory) is called the prior: your initial belief in T heory. P (Data|T heory) is the Likelihood: the probability of getting Data if T heory is true. P (T heory|Data) is the Posterior: your belief in T heory in the light of a particular Data being observed.
So this all works very sensibly. If the data observed is predicted by the theory, your belief in that theory is boosted, though this is moderated by the probabilty that the data could have arisen anyway. Conversely, if data is observed which is disfavoured by the theory, your belief in that theory is weakened.
The process can be chained. The posterior from a first experiment can be taken as the prior for a second experiment, and so on. When you write out the factors you find that the order doesn't matter.
Prior Distributions
Often, though, the theory being considered is not totally defined: it may contain a parameter (or several parameters) such as a mass, coupling constant, or decay rate. Generically we will call this a, with the proviso that it may be multidimensional.
The prior is now not a single number P (T heory) but a probability distribution P 0 (a). a 2 a 1 P 0 (a) da is your prior belief that a lies between a 1 and a 2 . ∞ −∞ P 0 (a) da is your original P (T heory). This is often taken as 1, which is valid if some value of a corresponds to no effect. Bayes' theorem then runs:
If the range of a is infinite, P 0 (a) may be vanishingly small (this is called an 'improper prior'). However this is not a problem. Suppose, for example, that all we know about a is that it is non-negative, and we are genuinely equally open to its having any value. We write P 0 (a) as C, so
. This probability is vanishingly small: if you were offered the choice of a bet on a iying within the range [a 1 , a 2 ] or of drawing a white ball from an urn containing 1 white ball and N black balls, you would choose the latter, however large N was. However it is not zero: if the urn contained N black balls but no white ball your betting choice would change. After a measurement you have P 1 (a; x) = L(a;x) L(a ;x)Cda C, and the factors of C can be cancelled (which, and this is the point, you coudl not do if C were exactly zero) giving P 1 (a; x) = L(a;x) L(a ;x)da or , P 1 (a; x) ∝ L(a; x), and you can then just normalise P 1 (a) to 1. 
Likelihood
The likelihood -the number P (data|theory) is now generalised to the function L(a, x), where x is the observed value of the data. Again, x may be multidimensional but in what follows it is not misleading to ignore that. This can be confusing. For example, anticipating section 3.2.2, the probability of getting x counts from a Poisson process with mean a is
We also write
What's the difference? Technically there is none. These are identical joint functions of two variables (x and a) to which we have just happened to have given different names. Pragmatically we regard Equation 5 as describing the probability of getting various different x from some fixed a, whereas Equation 6 describes the likelihood for various different a from some given x. But be careful with the term 'likelihood'. If P (x 1 , a) > P (x 2 , a) then x 1 is more probable (whatever you mean by that) than x 2 . If L(a 1 , x) > L(a 2 , x) it does not mean that a 1 is more likely (however you define that) than a 2 . 
Shortcomings of Bayesian Probability
The big problem with Bayesian probability is that it is subjective. Your P 0 (a) and my P 0 (a) may be different -so how can we compare results? Science does, after all, take pride in being objective: it handles real facts, not opinions. If you present a Bayesian result from your search for the X particle this embodies the actual experiment and your irrational prior prejudices. I am interested in your experiment but not in your irrational prior prejudices -I have my own -and it is unhelpful if you combine the two.
Bayesians sometimes ask about the right prior they should use. This is the wrong question. The prior is what you believe, and only you know that.
There is an argument made for taking the prior as uniform. This is sometimes called the 'Principle of ignorance' and justified as being impartial. But this is misleading, even dishonest. If P 0 (a) is taken as constant, favouring no particular value, then it is not constant for a 2 or √ a or ln a, which are equally valid parameters.
It is true that with lots of data, P 1 (a) decouples from P 0 (a). The final result depends only on the measurements. But this is not the case with little data -and that's the situation we're usually in, when doing statistics properly matters.
As an example, suppose you make a Gaussian measurement (anticipating slightly -see section 3.2.3). You consider a prior flat in a and a prior flat in ln a. This latter is quite sensible -it says you expect a result between 0.1 and 0. 
Jeffreys' Prior
Jeffreys [11] suggested a technique now known as the Jeffreys' or Objective Prior: that you should choose a prior flat in a transformed variable a for which the Fisher information, I = − ∂ 2 L(x;a) ∂a 2 is constant. The Fisher Information (which is important in Maximum Likelihood Estimation, as described in section 5.2) is a measure of how much a measurement tells you about the parameter: a large I has a likelihood function with a sharp peak and will tell you (by some measure) a lot about a; a small I has a featureless likelihood function which will not be useful. Jeffrey's principle is that the prior should not favour or disfavour particular values of the parameter. It is equivalently -and more conveniently -used as taking a prior in the original a which is proportional to
√ I
It has not been universally adopted for various reasons. Some practitioners like to be able to include their own prior belief into the analysis. It also makes the prior dependent on the experiment (in the form of the likelihood function). Thus if ATLAS and CMS searched for the same new X particle they would use different priors for P 0 (M X ), which is (to some people) absurd.
So it is not universal -but when you are selecting a bunch of priors to test robustness, the Jefferys' prior is a strong contender for inclusion.
Summary
So mathematical probability has no meaning, and real probability is discredited. That leaves the Frequentist and Bayesian definitions. Both are very much in use.
They are sometimes presented as rivals, with adherents on either side ('Frequentists versus Bayesians'.) This is needless drama. They are both tools that help us understand our results. Both have drawbacks. Sometimes it is clear which is the best tool for a particular job, sometimes there is not and one is free to choose either. It is said -probably accurately -that particle physicists feel happier with frequentist probability as they are used to large ensembles of similar but different events, whereas astrophysicists and cosmologists are more at home with Bayesian probability as they only have one universe to consider.
What is important is not which version you prefer -these are not football teams -but that you know the limitations of each, that you use the best definition when there is a reason to do so, and, above all, that you are aware of which form you are using.
As a possibly heretical afterthought, perhaps classical probability still has a place? Quantum Mechanics, after all, gives probabilities. If P A is not 'real' -either because it depends on an arbitrary ensemble, or because is a subjective belief -then it looks like there is nothing 'real' in the universe.
The state of a coin -or an electron spin -having probability 1 2 makes sense. There is a symmetry that dictates it. The lifetime of a muon -i.e. probability per unit time that it will decay -seems to be a well-defined quantity, a property of the muon and independent of any ensemble, or any Bayesian belief. The probability a muon will produce a signal in your muon detector seems like a 'real well-defined quantity, if you specify the 4 momentum and the state of the detector . Of course the inverse probability "What is the probability that a muon signal in my detector comes from a real muon, not background' is not intrinsically defined, So perhaps classical probability has a place in physics -but not in interpreting results. However you should not mention this to a statistician or they will think you're crazy.
Probability distributions and their properties
We have to make a simple distinction between two sorts of data: integer data and real-number data 1 .
The first covers results which are of their nature whole numbers: the numbers of kaons produced in a collision, or the number of entries falling into some bin of a histogram Generically let's call such numbers r, and they have probabilities P (r) which are dimensionless.
The second covers results whose values are real (or floating-point) numbers. There are lots of these: energies, angles, invariant masses... Generically let's call such numbers x, and they have Probability Density Functions P (x) which have dimensions of [x] −1 , so
You will also sometimes meet the cumulative distribution C(x) = x −∞ P (x ) dx .
Expectation Values
From P (r) or P (x) one can form the Expectation Value 1 Other branches of science have to include a third, categorical data, but we will ignore that.
where the sum or integral is taken as appropriate. Some authors write this as E(f ) but I personally prefer the angle-bracket notation. You may think it looks too like quantum mechanics, but in fact it's quantum mechanics which looks like statistics: an expression like ψ|Q|ψ is the average value of an operatorQ in some state ψ, where 'average value' has exactly the same meaning and significance.
Mean and Standard Deviation
In particular the mean, often written µ, is given by < r >= r rP (r) or
Similarly one can write higher moments
The second central moment is known as the Variance
The standard deviation is just the square root of the variance σ = √ V Statisticians usually use variance, perhaps because formulae come out simpler. Physicists usually use standard deviation, perhaps because it has the same dimensions as the variable being studied, and can be drawn as an error bar on a plot.
You may also meet Skew, which is γ = (x − µ) 3 /σ 3 and Kurtosis, h = (
Definitions vary, so be careful. Skew is a dimensionless measure of the asymmetry of a distribution. Kurtosis is (thanks to that rather arbitrary looking 3 in the definition) zero for a Gaussian distribution (see Section 3.2.3): positive kurtosis indicates a narrow core with a wide tail, negative kurtosis indicates the tails are reduced.
Covariance and Correlation
If your data are 2-dimensional pairs (x, y) then you can not only form < x >, < y >, σ x etc but also the Covariance
Examples are shown in Figure 5 . If there is a tendency for positive fluctuations in x to be associated with positive fluctuations in y (and therefore negative with negative) then the product (x i − x)(y i − y) tends to be positive and the covariance is greater than 0. A negative covariance, as in the 3rd plot, happens if a positive fluctuation in one variable is associated with a negative fluctuation in the other. If the variables are independent then a positive variation in x is equally likely to be associated with a positive or a negative fluctuation in y and the covariance is zero, as in the first plot. However the converse is not always the case, there can be two dimensional distributions where the covariance is zero but the two variables are not independent, as is shown in the fourth plot.
Covariance is useful but it has dimensions. Often one uses the Correlation which is just
It is easy to show that ρ lies between 1 (complete correlation) and -1 (complete anticorrelation). ρ = 0 if x and y are independent. If there are more than two variables -the alphabet runs out so let's call them (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 . . . x n ) then these generalise to the Covariance matrix
and the Correlation matrix
The diagonal of V is σ 2 i . The diagonal of ρ is 1.
Binomial, Poisson and Gaussian
We now move from considering the general properties of distributions to considering three specific ones. These are the ones you will most commonly meet for the distribution of the original data (as opposed to quantities constructed from it). Actually the first, the binomial, is not nearly as common as the second, the Poisson, and the third, the Gaussian, is overwhelmingly more common again. However it is useful to consider all three as concepts are built up from the simple to the more sophisticated
The Binomial Distribution
The binomial distribution is easy to understand as it basically describes the familar 2 tossing of coins. It describes the number r of successes in N trials, each with probability p of success. r is discrete so the process is described by a probability distribution is
where
Some examples are shown in Figure 6 .
The distribution has mean µ = N p, variance V = N pq, and standard Deviation σ = √ N pq 
The Poisson Distribution
The Poisson distribution also describes the probability of some discrete number r, but rather than a fixed number of 'trials' it considers a random rate λ.
It is linked to the binomial -the Poisson is the limit of the binomial as N → ∞, p → 0 with np = λ = constant Figure 7 shows various examples. It has mean µ = λ, variance V = λ, and standard seviation σ =
The clicks of a Geiger counter are the standard illustration of a Poisson process. You will meet it a lot as it applies to event counts -on their own or in histogram bins.
To help you think about the Poisson, here is simple question (which describes a situation I have seen in practice, more than once, from people who ought to know better).
You need to know the efficiency of your PID system for positrons.
You find 1000 data events where 2 tracks have a combined mass of 3.1 GeV (J/ψ) and the negative track is identified as an e − . ('Tag-and-probe' technique)
In 900 events the e + is also identified. In 100 events it is not. Efficiency is 90%
What about the error?
Colleague A says √ 900 = 30 so efficiency is 90.0 ± 3.0%
Colleague B says √ 100 = 10 so efficiency is 90.0 ± 1.0%
Which is right?
Please think about this before turning the page...
Neither -both are wrong
This is binomial not Poisson: p = 0.9, N = 1000
.49 so the efficiency is 90.0 ± 0.9 %
The Gaussian
This is far and away the most important statistical distribution. The pdf for a variable x is given by the formula
Pictorially this is shown in Figure 8 The mean is µ and the standard deviation is σ. The Skew is zero, as it is symmetric, and the kurtosis is zero by construction..
In statistics, and most disciplines, this is known as the Normal Distribution. Only in physics is it known as 'The Gaussian' -perhaps because the word 'normal' already has so many meanings.
The reason for the importance of the Gaussian is the Central Limit theorem which states that: if the variable X is the sum of N variables x 1 , x 2 . . . x N then: Before proving this it is helpful to see a demonstration, to convince yourself that the implausible assertion in (3) actually does happen Take a uniform distribution from 0 to 1, as shown in the top left subplot of Figure 9 . . It is flat. Add two such numbers and the distribution is triangular, between 0 and 2, as shown in the top right The proof follows.
This can usefully be thought of as an expectation value and as a Fourier Transform.
Expand the exponential as a series 
r is made up of expectation values of x of total power r
These are called the semi-invariant cumulants of Thièle . Under a change of scale α, κ r → α r κ r .
Under a change in location only κ 1 changes.
If X is the sum of i.i.d. random variables:
The FT of convolution is the product of the individual FTs
The logarithm of a product is the sum of the logarithms So P (X) has cumulants K r = N κ r To make graphs commensurate, you need to scale the X axis by the standard deviation, which grows like
As N → ∞ these vanish for r > 2. Leaving a a quadratic.
If the log is a quadratic, the exponential is a Gaussian. SoP (X) is Gausian.
And finally, the inverse FT of a Gaussian is also a Gaussian.
Even if the distributions are not identical, the CLT tends to apply, unless one (or two) dominates. Most 'errors' fit this, being compounded of many different sources.
Hypothesis testing
'Hypothesis testing' is another piece of statistical technical jargon. It just means 'making choices' -in a logical way, on the basis of statistical information.
-Is some track a pion or a kaon? -Is this event signal or background? -Is the detector performance degrading with time? -Do the data agree with the Standard Model prediction or not?
To establish some terms: you have a hypothesis (the track is a pion, the event is signal, the detector is stable, the Standard Model is fine...). and an alternative hypothesis (kaon, background, changing, New Physics needed...) Your hypothesis is usually simple i.e. completely specified, but the alternative is often composite containing a parameter(for example, the detector decay rate) which may have any non-zero value.
Type I and Type II errors
As an example, let's use the signal/background decision. Do you accept or reject the event (perhaps in the trigger, perhaps in your offline analysis).? To make things easy we consider the case where both hypotheses are simple, i.e. completely defined.
Suppose you measure some parameter x which is related to what you are trying to measure. It may well be output from a neural network or other ML system. The expected distributions for x under the hypothesis and the alternative, S and B respectively, are shown in figure 10. This means losing a fraction α of signal. This is called a Type I error and α is known as the significance.
You admit a fraction β of background. This is called a Type II error and 1 − β is the power You would like to know the best place to put the cut. This graph cannot tell you! The strategy for the cut depends on three things -hypothesis testing only covers one of them
The second is the prior signal to noise ratio. These plots are normalised to 1. The red curve is (probably) MUCH bigger. A value of β of, say, 0.01 looks nice and small -only one in a hundred background events get through. But if your background is 10,000 times bigger than your signal (and it often is) you are still swamped.
The third is the cost of making mistakes, which will be different for the two types of error. You have a trade-off between efficiency and purity: what are they worth? In a typical analysis, a type II error is more serious than a type I: losing a signal event is regrettable but it happens, but including background event in your selected pure sample can give a very misleading result. By contrast, in medical decisions, type I errors are much worse than type II. Telling a healthy patient they are sick leads to worry and perhaps further tests, but telling a sick patient they are healthy means they don't get the treatment they need.
The Neymann-Pearson Lemma
In figure 10 the strategy is plain -you choose x cut and evaluate α and β. But suppose the S and B curves are more complicated, as in figure 11 ? Or that x is multidimensional? The proof is simple: having done this, if you then move a small region from 'accept' to 'reject' it has to be replaced by an equivalent region, to balance α, which (by construction) brings more background, increasing β.
However complicated, such a problem reduces to a single monotonic variable S B , and you cut on that.
Efficiency, Purity, and ROC plots
ROC plots are often used to show the efficacy of different selection variables. You scan over the cut value (in x, for figure 10 or for S/B for a case like figure 11 and plot the fraction of background accepted (β) against fraction of signal retained (1 − α), as shown in figure 12. For a very loose cut all data is accepted, corresponding to a point at the top right. As the cut is tightened both signal and background fractions fall, so the point moves to the left and down, though hopefully the background loss is greater than the signal loss, so it moves more to the left than it does downwards. As the cut is increased the line moves towards the bottom left, the limit of a very tight cut where all data is rejected.
A diagonal line corresponds to no discrimination -the S and B curves are identical. The further the actual line bulges away from that diagonal, the better.
Where you should put your cut depends, as pointed out earlier, also on the prior signal/background ratio and the relative costs of errors. So the ROC plot does not tell you that. But they can be useful in comparing the performance of different discriminators.
The name 'ROC' stands for 'Receiver Operating Characterisic', for reasons that are lost in history. Actually it is good to use this meaningless acronym, otherwise they get called 'Efficiency-Purity' plots even though they definitely do not show the purity (they cannot, as that depends on the overall signal/background ratio). Be careful, as the phrases 'Background Efficiency', 'Contamination', and 'Purity' are used ambiguously in the literature.
The Null Hypothesis
An analysis is often (but not always) investigating whether an effect is present, motivated by the hope that the results will show that it is: -Eating broccoli makes you smart. -Facebook advertising increases sales. -A new drug increases patient survival rates.
-The data show Beyond-the-Standard-Model physics.
To reach such a conclusion you have to use your best efforts to try, and to fail, to prove the opposite: the Null Hypothesis H 0 -Broccoli lovers and broccoli loathers have the same IQ -Sales are independent of the Facebook advertising budget -The survival rates for old and new treatments are the same -The Standard Model (functions or Monte-Carlo) describe the data If the null hypothesis is not tenable, you've proved -or at least, supported -your point.
The reason for calling α the 'significance' is now clear. It is the probability that the null hypothesis will be wrongly rejected, and you'll claim an effect where there isn't any.
There is a minefield of difficulties. Correlation is not causation. If broccoli eaters are more intelligent, perhaps that's because it's intelligent to eat green vegetables, not that vegetables make you intelligent. One has to consider that if similar experiments are done, self-censorship will influence which results get published. This is further discussed in Section 9 This account is perhaps unconventional in introducing the null hypothesis at such a late stage. Most treatments bring it in right at the start of the description of hypothesis testing, because they assume that all decisions are of this type.
Estimation
What statisticians call Estimation physicists would generally call 'Measurement'.
Suppose you know the probability (density) function P (x; a) and you take a set of data {x i }. What is the best value for a? (Sometimes one wants to estimate a property (e.g. the mean) rather than a parameter, but this is relatively uncommon, and the methodology is the same.)
x i may be single values, or pairs, or higher-dimensional. The unknown a may be a single parameter or several. If it has more than one component, these are sometimes split into 'parameters of interest' and 'nuisance parameters'
The estimator is defined very broadly: an estimatorâ(x 1 . . . x N ) is a function of the data that gives a value for the parameter a There is no 'correct' estimator -but some are better than others. A perfect estimator would be
2 > is as small as possible
No estimator is perfect -these 4 goals are incompatible. In particular the second and the fourth; if an estimatorâ is unbiassed for a then √â is not an unbiassed estimator of √ a.
Bias
Suppose we estimate the mean by taking the obviousμ = x
So there is no bias. This expectation value of this estimator of µ is just µ itself. By contrast suppose we estimate the variance by the apparently obviousV
The first term is just x 2 . To make sense of second term, note x = x and add and subtract
Note the difference between < x > which is an average over a pdf and x which denotes the average over a partIcular sample: both are called 'the mean x'.
So the estimator is biassed!V will, on average, give too small a value.
This bias, like any known bias, can be corrected for. UsingV = N N −1 (x 2 − x 2 ) corrects the bias.
The familar estimator for the standard deviation follows:
(Of course this gives a biassed estimate of σ. But V is generally more important in this context.)
Efficiency
Somewhat surprisingly, there is a limit to the efficiency of an estimator: the Minimum Variance Bound, also known as the Cramer-Rao bound
For any unbiassed estimatorâ(x), the variance is bounded
L is the likelihood (as introduced in section 2.6.2) of a sample of independent measurements, i.e. the probability for the whole data sample for a particular value of a. It is just the product if the individual probabilities:
We will write L(a;
Proof. Proof of the MVB
Differentiate wrt a:
Ifâ is unbiassed â = â(x)P (x; a) dx = â(x)L(a; x) dx = a Differentiate wrt a:
da dx Subtract Eq 13 multiplied by a, and get (â − a)
This is the Fisher Information referred to in section 2.6.4. Note how it is intrinsically positive.
Maximum Likelihood Estimation
The Maximum Likelihood (ML) Estimator just does what it says: a is adjusted to maximise the likelihood of the sample. (For practical reasons one actually maximises the log likelihood, which is a sum rather than a product.)
The ML estimator is very commonly used. It is not only simple and intuitive, it has lots of nice properties.
-It is consistent. -It is biassed, but bias falls like 1/N -It is efficient for large N -It is invariant -doesn't matter if you reparametrise a A particular maximisation problem may be solved in 3 ways, depending on the complexity 
Least squares
Least Squares Estimation follows from Maximum Likelihood Estimation. If you have Gaussian measurements of y taken at various x values, with measurement error σ, and a prediction y = f (x; a) then the Gaussian probability
gives the log likelihood
-hence the name 'least squares'.
Differentiating gives the Normal Equations:
If f (x; a) is linear in a then these can be solved exactly. Otherwise an iterative method has to be used.
Straight line fits
As a particular instance of least squares estimation, suppose the function is y = mx + c We assume all σ i are the same (the extension to the general case is straightforward). The Normal Equations are then The history of regression started with Galton, who measured the heights of fathers and their (adult) sons. Tall parents tend to have tall children so there is a correlation, but because the height of a son depends not just on his paternal genes but on many factors (maternal genes, diet, childhood illnesses...) the points do not line up exactly -and using a high accuracy laser interferometer to do the measurements, rather than a simple ruler, would not change anything.
Galton, incidentlly, used this to show that although tall fathers tend to have tall sons, they are not that tall. An outstandingly tall father will have (on average) quite tall children, and only tallish grandchildren. He called this 'Regression towards mediocrity', hence the name.
It is also true that tall sons tend to have tall fathers -but not that tall -and only tallish grandfathers. Regress works in both directions! Thus for regression there is always an ambiguity as to whether to plot x against y or y against x. For a straight line fit as we usually meet them this does not arise: one variable is precisely specified and we call that one x, and the one with measurement errors is y.
Fitting Histograms
When fitting a histogram the error is given by Poisson statistics for the number of events in each bin.
There are 4 methods of approaching this problem -in order of increasing accuracy and decreasing speed. It is assumed that the bin width W is narrow, so that f (x i , a) =
P (x, a) dx can be approximated by f i (x i ; a) = P (x i ; a) × W . W is almost always the same for each bin, but the rare cases of variable binwidth can easily be included.
. This is the simplest but clearly breaks if n i = 0.
. Minimising the Pearson χ 2 (which is valid here) avoids the divisionby-zero problem. It assumes that the Poisson distribution can be approximated by a Gaussian. Which method to use is something you have to decide on a case by case basis. If you have bins with zero entries then the first method is ruled out (and removing such bins from the fit introduces bias so this should not be done). Otherwise, in my experience, the improvement in adopting a more complicated method tends to be small.
Errors
Estimation gives you a value for the parameter(s) that we have called a. But you also -presumably -want to know something about the uncertainty on that estimate. The Maximum Likelihood method provides this.
Errors from Likelihood
For large N , the ln L(a, x) curve is parabola, as shown in figure 16 ..
At the maximum, a Taylor expansion gives
.. The Maximum Likelihood Estimator saturates the MVB, so
We approximate the expectation value
by the actual value in this case
(For a discussion of the inaccuracy introduced see [12] ). This gives σ, or 68% errors. You c also take ∆ ln L = −2 to get 2 sigma or 95% errors, or −4.5 for 3 sigma errors as desired. For large N these will all be consistent.
Combining Errors
Having obtained -by whatever means -errors σ x , σ y ... how does one combine them to get errors on derived quantities f (x, y...), g(x, y, ...)?
Suppose f = Ax + By + C, with A, B and C constant. Then it is easy to show that
If f is not a simple linear function of x and y then one can use a first order Taylor expansion to approximate it about a central value f 0 (x 0 , y 0 )
and application of Equation 18 gives
writing the more familiar σ 2 instead of V this is equivalent to 
which, dividing by f 2 , can be written as
Furthermore this also applies if f is a simple quotient, f = Ax/y or Ay/x or even A/(xy). A full error analysis has to include the treatment of the covariance terms -if only to show that they can be ignored. Why should the x and y in Equation 20 be correlated? For direct measurements then very often( but not always) they will not be. However the interpretation of results is generally a multistage process. From raw numbers of events one computes branching ratios (or cross sections...), from which one computes matrix elements (or particle masses...). Many quantities of interest to theorists are expressed as ratios of experimental numbers. And in this interpretation there is plenty of scope for correlations to creep into the analysis.
For example, an experiment might measure a cross section σ(pp → X) from a number of observed events N in the decay channel X → µ + µ − . One would use a formula
where η is the efficiency for detecting and reconstructing an event, B is the branching ratio for X → µ + µ − , and L is the integrated luminosity. These will all have errors on, and the above prescription can be applied.
However it might also use the X → e + e − channel and then use σ = N B η L Now σ and σ are clearly correlated; even though N and N are independent, the same L appears in both. If the estimate of L is on the high side, that will push both σ and σ downwards, and vice versa.
On the other hand, if a second experiment did the same measurement it would have its own N , η and L but would be correlated with the first through using the same branching ratio (take, presumably, from the Particle Data Group).
To calculate correlations between results we need the equivalent of Equation 18
Cov
This can all be combined in the general formula which encapsulates all of the ones above
where V x is the covariance matrix of the primary quantities (often, as pointed out earlier, this is diagonal), V f is the covariance matrix of secondary quantities, and
The G matrix is rectangular but need not be square. There may be more -or fewer -derived quantities than primary quantities. The matrix algebra of G and its transposeG ensures that the numbers of rows and columns match for Equation 25.
To show how this works, we go back to our earlier example of a cylinder. v and a are correlated: if r or h fluctuate upwards (or downwards), that makes both volume and area larger (or smaller). The matrix G is We can also check that this is correct, because the ration v a can be written as
, and applying the uncorrelated errors of the original r and h to this also gives an error of 0.62 mm.
As a second, hopefully helpful, example we consider a simple straight line fit, y = mx + c. Assuming that all the N y values are measured with the same error σ, Least Squares Estimation gives the well known results
For simplicity we write D = 1/(x 2 − x 2 ). The differentials are
from which, remembering that the y values are uncorrelated
from which the correlation between m and c is just
This makes sense. Imagine you're fitting a straight line through a set of points with a range of positive x values (so x is positive). If the rightmost point happened to be a bit higher, that would push the slope m up and the intercept c down. Likewise if the leftmost point happened to be too high that would push the slope down and the intercept up. There is a negative correlation between the two fitted quantities.
Does it matter? Sometimes. Not if you're just interested in the slope -or the constant. But suppose you intend to use them to find the expected value of y at some extrapolated x. Equation 21 gives
and if you leave out the correlation term you will overestimate your error. This is an educational example because this correlation can be avoided. Shifting to a co-ordinate system in which x is zero ensures that the quantities are uncorrelated. This is equivalent to rewriting the well-known y = mx + c formula as y = m(x − x) + c , where m is the same as before and c = c + mx. m and c are now uncorrelated, and error calculations involving them become a lot simpler.
Asymmetric Errors
So what happens if you plot the likelihood function and it is not symmetric like figure 16 but looks more like figure 17? This arises in many cases when numbers are small. For instance, in a simple Poisson count suppose you observe 1 event. P (1; λ) = λe −λ is not symmetric: λ = 1.5 is more likely to fluctuate down to 1 than λ = 0.5 is to fluctuate up to 1.
You can read off σ + and σ − from the two ∆ ln L = − can convince yourself that the difference between σ + and σ − is small enough to be ignored then you should do so, as the alternative brings in a whole lot of trouble and it's not worth it.
But there will be some cases where the difference is too great to be swept away, so let's consider that case. There are two problems that arise: combination of measurements and combination of errors. If you know the likelihood functions, you can do it. The joint likelihood is just the sum. This is shown in figure 18 where the red and green curves are measurements of a The log likelihood functions just add (blue) from which the peak is found and the ∆ ln L = − 1 2 errors read off. But you don't know the full likelihood function: just 3 points (and that it had a maximum at the second). There are, of course, an infinite number of curves that could be drawn., and several likely model have been tried (cubics, constrained quartic...) on likely instances -see reference [13] for details. Some do better than others. The wo most plausible are
Combination of Measurements with Asymmetric Errors
These are similar to the Gaussian parabola, but the denominator is not constant but varies with the value of a, this being linear either in the standard deviation or in the variance. Both are pretty good.
The first does better with errors on log a (which are asymmetric if a is symmetric: such asymmetric error bars are often seen on plots where the y axis is logarithmic), the second does better with Poisson measurements.
From the 3 numbers given one readily obtains
From the total likelihood you then find the maximum of sum, numerically, and the ∆ ln L = − points.
Code for doing this is available on github https://github.com/RogerJBarlow/Asymmetric-Errors in both R and Root. 
Combination of Errors for Asymmetric Errors
For symmetric errors, given x ± σ x , y ± σ y , (and ρ xy = 0) the error on f (x, y) is the sum in quadrature: The standard procedure -which you will see done, though it has not, to my knowledge, been written down anywhere -is to add the positive and negative errors in quadrature separately: σ
2 . This looks plausible but it is manifestly wrong as it breaks the central limit theorem.
To see this, suppose you have to average N i.i.d. variables each with the same errors which are asymmetirc: σ + = 2σ − . The standard procedure reduces both σ + and σ − by factor 1/ √ N , but the skewness remains. The positive error is twice the negative error. This is therefore not Gaussian, and never will be, even as N → ∞.
You can see what's happening by considering the combination of two of these measurements. They both may fluctuate upwards, or they both may fluctuate downwards, and yes, the upward fluctuation will be, on average, twice as big. But there is a 50% chance of one upward and one downward fluctuation, which is not considered in the standard procedure. 
where σ, σ , V, V are obtained from Equations 31 or 32.
The z i are nuisance parameters (as described later) and can be removed by profiling. Let u = z i be the total deviation in the quoted f arising from the individual deviations. We formL(u) as the maximum of L( z) subject to the constraint i z i = u. The method of undetermined multipliers readily gives the solution
the equations are nonlinear but can be solved iteratively. At u = 0 all the z i are zero. Increasing (or decreasing) u in small steps, Equations 34 and 35 are applied successively to give the z i and the w i : convergence is rapid. The value of u which maximises the likelihood should in principle be applied as a correction to the quoted result.
Programs to do this are also available on the github site.
As an example, consider a counting experiment with a number of backgrounds, each determined by an ancillary Poisson experiment, and that for simplicity each background was determined by running the apparatus for the same time as the actual experiment. (In practice this is unlikely, but scale factors can easily be added.)
Suppose two backgrounds are measured, one giving 4 events and the other 5. These would be reported, using ∆lnL = − 
Errors in 2 or more dimensions
For 2 (or more) dimensions, one plots the log likelihood and defines regions using contours in ∆ ln L (or ∆χ 2 ≡ −2∆ ln L). An example is given in figure 20 . The link between the ∆ ln L values and the significance changes. In 1D, there is a 68% probability of a measurement falling within 1 σ. In 2D, a 1σ square would give a probability 0.68 2 = 47%. If one rounds off the corners and draws a 1σ contour at ∆ ln L = − 1 2 this falls to 39%. To retrieve the full 68% one has to draw a contour at ∆ ln L = −1.14, or equivalently ∆χ 2 = 2.27. For 95% use ∆χ 2 = 5.99
The necessary value is obtained from the χ 2 distribution -described later. It can be found by the R function qchisq(p,n) or the Root function TMath::ChiSquareQuantile(p,n), where the desired probabilty p and number of degrees of freedom n are the arguments given.
Nuisance Parameters
In the example above, both C V and C F are interesting. But in many cases one is interested only in one (or some) of the quantities and the others are 'nuisance parameters' that one would like to remove, reducing the dimensionality of the quoted result. There are two methods of doing this, one (basically) frequentist and one Bayesian
The frequentist uses the Profile Likelihood technique. Suppose that there are two parameters, a 1 and a 2 , where a 2 is a nuisance parameter, and so one wants to reduce the joint likelihood function L(x; a 1 , a 2 ) to some functionL(a 1 ). To do this one scans across the values of a 1 and insertsâ 2 (a 1 ), the value of a 2 which maximises the likelihood for that particular a 1
and the location of the maximum and the ∆ ln L = To see why this works -though this is not a very rigorous motivation -suppose one had a likelihood function as shown in figure 21. The horizontal axis is for the parameter of interest, a 1 , and the vertical for the nuisance parameter a 2 .
Different values of a 2 give different results (central and errors) for a 1
If it is possible to transform to a 2 (a 1 , a 2 ) so L factorises, then we can write.
: this is shown in the plot on the right. We suppose that this is indeed possible. In the case here, and other not-too-complicated cases, it clearly is, although it will not be so in more complicated topologies with multiple peaks.
Then using the transformed graph, whatever the value of a 2 , one would get the same result for a 1 . Then one can present this result for a 1 , independent of anything about a 2 .
There is no need to factorise explicitly: the path of central a 2 value as a function of a 1 (the central of the 3 lines on the right hand plot) is the path of the peak, and that path can be located in the first plot (the transformation only stretches the a 2 axis, it does not change the heights).
The Bayesian uses the technique called marginalisation, which just integrates over a 2 . Frequentists can not do this as they are not allowed to integrate likelihoods over the parameter: P (x; a) dx is fine, but P (x; a) da is off limits. Nevertheless this can be a very helpful alternative to profiling, specially for many nuisance parameters. But if you use it you must be aware that this is strictly Bayesian. Reparametrising a 2 (or choosing a different prior) will give different results for a 1 . In many cases, where the effect of the nuisance parameter is small, this does not have a big effect on the result.
Systematic Errors
This can be a touchy subject. There is a lot of bad practice out there. Muddled thinking and following traditional procedures without understanding. When statistical errors dominated, this didn't matter much. In the days of particle factories and big data samples, it does.
What is a Systematic Error?
Consider these two quotations, from eminent and widely-read authorities. R Bevington defines [15] "Systematic error: reproducible inaccuracy introduced by faulty equipment, calibration, or technique." whereas J Orear writes [16] "Systematic effects is a general category which includes effects such as background, scanning efficiency, energy resolution, variation of counter efficiency with beam position, and energy, dead time, etc. The uncertainty in the estimation of such a systematic effect is called a systematic error."
Read these carefully and you will see that they are contradictory. They are not talking about the same thing. Furthernore, Orear is RIGHT and Bevington is WRONG -as are a lot of other books and websites
We teach undergraduates the difference between measurement errors, which are part of doing science, and mistakes. In the quotes above, Bevington is describing systematic mistakes (the word 'faulty' is the key) whereas Orear is describing systematic uncertainties -which are 'errors' in the way we use the term.
There is a case for saying one should avoid the term 'systematic error' and always use 'uncertainty' or 'mistake'. This is probably impossible. But should always know which you mean.
Restricting ourselves to uncertainties (we will come back to mistakes later) here are some typical examples (Sometimes the ancillary experiment is also the main experiment -e.g. in estimating background from sidebands. ) There are also uncertainties that can only be Bayesian, e.g. when a theorist tells you that their calculation is good to 5% (or whatever) or an experimentalist affirms that the calibration will not have shifted during the run by more than 2% (or whatever).
How to handle them: Correlation
Working with systematic errors is actually quite straightforward. They obey the same rules as statistical uncertainties.
We write x = 12.2 ± 0.3 ± 0.4 "where the first error is statistical and the second is systematic" but it would be valid to write x = 12.2 ± 0.5. For single measurement the extra information given by the two separate numbers is small. (In this case it just tells you that there us little to be gained by increasing the size of the data sample). For multiple measurements e.g. x a = 12.2 ± 0.3, x b = 17.1 ± 0.4, all ± 0.5 the extra information is important, as results are correlated. Such cases arise, for example, in cross section measurements with a common luminosity error, or branching ratios with common efficiency.
Such a correlation means that taking more measurements and averaging does not reduce the error. Also there is no way to estimate σ sys from the data -hence no check on the goodness of fit from a χ 2 test.
Handling Systematic Errors in your analysis
It is useful to consider systematic errors as having three types 1. Uncertainty in an explicit continuous parameter. For example an uncertainty in efficiency, background and luminosity in determining a branching ratio or cross section. For these the standard combination of errors formula and algebra are usable, just like undergraduate labs 2. Uncertainty in an implicit continuous parameter. For example: MC tuning parameters (σ p T , polarisation......) These are not amenable to algebra. instead one calculates the result for different parameter values, typically at ±σ, and observes the variation in the result, as illustrated in Figure 22 . Hopefully the effect is equal but opposite -if not then one can reluctantly quote an asymmetric error. Also your analysis results will have errors due to finite MC statistics. Some people add these in quadrature. This is wrong. Technically correct thing to do is subtract them in quadrature, but this is not advised.
Discrete uncertainties
These typically occur in model choices. Using a different Monte Carlo for background -or signal -gives you a (slightly) different result. How do you include this uncertainty? The situation depends on the status of the models. Sometimes one is preferred, sometimes all equal (more or less). With 1 preferred model and one other, quote R 1 ± |R 1 − R 2 | With 2 models of equal status, quote
or similar mean value 2 extreme models: take
These are just ballpark estimates. Do not push them too hard. If the difference is not small, you have a problem -which can be an opportunity to study model differences.
Checking the analysis
"As we know, there are known knowns. There are things we know that we know. There are known unknowns. That is to say, there are things that we know we don't know. But there are also unknown unknowns. There are things we don't know we don't know." Donald H Rumsfeld
Errors are not mistakes -but mistakes still happen. Statistical tools can help find them. Check your result by repeating the analysis with changes which should make no difference: -Data subsets -Magnet up/down -Different selection cuts -Changing histogram bin size and fit ranges -Changing parametrisation (including order of polynomial) -Changing fit technique -Looking for impossibilities -...
The more tests the better. You cannot prove the analysis is correct. But the more tests it survives the more likely your colleagues 4 will be to believe the result.
For example: in the paper reporting the first measurement of CP violation in B mesons the BaBar collaboration [17] reported ".. consistency checks, including separation of the decay by decay mode, tagging category and B tag flavour... We also fit the samples of non-CP decay modes for sin 2β with no statistically significant difference found."
If your analysis passes a test then tick the box and move on. Do not add the discrepancy to the systematic error. Many people do -and your supervisor and your review committee may want you to do so. Do not give in. Only as a last resort, add the term to the systematic error. Remember that this could be a hint of something much bigger and nastier. If you find yourself in such a situation there are actually two ways to tell the difference.
(1) Are you expecting to see an effect? If so, it's an evaluation, if not, it's a check (2) Do you clearly know how much to vary them by? If so, it's an evaluation. If not, it's a check.
These cover even complicated cases such as a trigger energy cut where the energy calibration is uncertain -and it may be simpler to simulate the effect by varying the cut rather than the calilbration.
6.5.6 So finally:
1. Thou shalt never say 'systematic error' when thou meanest 'systematic effect' or 'systematic mistake'. 2. Thou shalt know at all times whether what thou performest is a check for a mistake or an evaluation of an uncertainty. 3. Thou shalt not incorporate successful check results into thy total systematic error and make thereby a shield to hide thy dodgy result. 4. Thou shalt not incorporate failed check results unless thou art truly at thy wits' end. 5. Thou shalt not add uncertainties on uncertainties in quadrature. If they are larger than chickenfeed thou shalt generate more Monte Carlo until they shrink. 6. Thou shalt say what thou doest, and thou shalt be able to justify it out of thine own mouth; not the mouth of thy supervisor, nor thy colleague who did the analysis last time, nor thy local statistics guru, nor thy mate down the pub.
Do these, and thou shalt flourish, and thine analysis likewise.
Goodness of Fit
You have the best fit model to your data -but is it good enough? The upper plot in figure 23 shows the best straight line through a set of points which are clearly not well described by a straight line. How can one quantify this?
You construct some measure of agreement -call it t -between the model and the data. Convention: t ≥ 0, t = 0 is perfect agreement. Worse agreement implies larger t. The null hypothesis H 0 is that the model did indeed produce this data. You calculate the p−value: the probability under H 0 of getting a t this bad, or worse. This is shown schematically in the lower plot. Usually this can be done using known algebra -if not one can use simulation (a so-called 'Toy Monte Carlo').
The χ 2 distribution
The overwhelmingly most used such measure of agreement is the quantity χ
in words: the total of the squared differences between prediction and data, scaled by the expected error.
Obviously each term will be about 1, so χ 2 ≈ N , and this turns out to be exact.
The distribution for χ 2 is given by
shown in figure 24, though this is in fact not much used: one is usually interested in the p−value, the probability (under the null hypothesis) of getting a value of χ 2 as large as. or larger than, the 
Wilks' Theorerm
The Likelihood on its own tells you nothing. Even if you include all the constant factors normally omitted in maximisation. This may seem counterintuitive but it inescapably true.
There is a theorem due to Wilks which is frequently invoked and appears to link likelihood and χ 2 , but it does so only in very specific circumstances. Given two nested models, for large N the improvement in ln L is distributed like χ 2 in −2∆ ln L, with N DF the number of extra parameters
So suppose you have some data with many (x, y) values and two models, Model 1 being linear and Model 2 quadratic. You maximise the likelihood using Model 1 and then using Model 2: the Likelihood increases as more parameters available (N DF = 1) . If this increase is significantly more than N that justifies using Model 2 rather than Model 1. So it may tell you whether or not the extra term in a quadratic gives a meaningful improvement, but not whether the final quadratic (or linear) model is a good one.
Even this has an important exception. it does not apply if Model 2 contains a parameter which is meaningless under Model 1. This is a surprisingly common occurrence. Model 1 may be background, Model 2 background plus a Breit-Wigner with adjustable mass, width and normalisation (N DF = 3). The mass and the width are meaningless under Model 1 so Wilks' theorem does not apply and the improvement in likelihood cannot be translated into a χ 2 for testing.
Toy Monte Carlos and Likelihood for Goodness of Fit
Although the likelihood contains no information about the goodness of fit of the model, an obvious way to get such information is to run many simulations of the model, plot the spread of fitted likelihoods and use to get p−value.
This may be obvious but it is wrong [18] . Consider a test case observing decay times where the model is a simple exponential P (t) = 1 τ e −t/τ , with τ an adjustable parameter. Then you get the Log Likelihood (−t i /τ − ln τ ) = −N (t/τ + ln τ ) and maximum likelihood givest = t = 1 N i t i , so ln L(t; x) = −N (1 + ln t) . This holds whatever the original sample {t i } looks like: any distribution with the same t has the same likelihood, after fitting.
Upper Limits
Many analyses are 'searches for...' and most of these are unsuccessful. But you have to say something! Not just 'We looked but didn't see anything.' This is done using the construction of frequentist confidence intervals and/or Bayesian credible intervals.
Frequentist Confidence
Going back to the discussion of the basics, for frequentists the probability that it will rain tomorrow is meaningless: there is only one tomorrow, it will either rain or it will not, there is no ensemble. The probability N rain /N tomorrows is either 0 or 1. To talk about P rain is "unscientific" [10] . This is unhelpful. But there is a workaround.
Suppose some forecast says it will rain and studies show this forecast is correct 90% of the time. We now have an ensemble of statements, and can say: "The statement 'It will rain tomorrow' has a 90% probability of being true." We shorten this to 'It will rain tomorrow, with 90% confidence'. We state X with confidence P if X is a member of an ensemble of statements of which at least P are true.
Note the 'at least' which has crept into the definition. There are two reasons for it 1. Higher confidences embrace lower ones. If X at 95% then X at 90% 2. We can cater for composite hypotheses which are not completely defined.
The familiar quoted error is in fact a confidence statement. Consider as an illustration the Higgs mass measurement (current at the time of writing) M H = 125.09 ± 0.24 GeV. This does not mean that the probability of the Higgs mass being in the range 124.85 < M H < 125.33 GeV is 68%: the Higgs mass is a single, unique, number which either lies in this interval or it does not. What we are saying is that M H has been measured to be 125.09 GeV with a technique that will give a value within 0.24 GeV of the true value 68% of the time We say: 124.85 < M H < 125.33GeV with 68% confidence. The statement is either true or false (time will tell) but belongs to a collection of statements of which (at least) 68% are true.
So we construct Confidence Regions also known as Confidence Intervals [x − , x + ] such that
We have not only a choice of the probability content (68%, 90%, 95%, 99%...) to work with but also over strategy. Common options are:
For the Gaussian (or any symmetric pdf) 1-3 are the same.
We are particularly concerned with the upper limit: we observe some small value x. We find a value x + such that for values of x + or more the probability of getting a result as small as x, or even less, is 1 − CL, or even less.
Confidence Belts
We have shown that a simple Gaussian measurement is basically a statement about confidence regions. x = 100 ± 10 implies that [90,110] is 68% central confidence region.
We want to extend this to less simple scenarios. As a first step, we consider a proportional Gaussian. Suppose we measure x = 100 from Gaussian measurement with σ = 0.1x (a 10% measurement -which is realistic). If the true value is 90 the error is σ = 9 so x = 100 is more than one standard deviation, whereas if the true value is 110 then σ = 11 and it is less than one standard deviation. 90 and 110 not equidistant from 100. This is done with a technique called a Confidence Belt. The key point is that they are are constructed horizontally and read vertically, using the following procedure (as shown in figure 25 ). Suppose that a is the parameter of intersnt and x is the measurement.
1. For each a, construct desired confidence interval (here 68% central) 2. The result (x, a) lies inside the belt (the red lines), with 68% confidence. The only difference is that the horizontal axis is discrete as the number observed, x, is integer. In constructing the belt (horizontally) there will not in general be x values available to give
= CL and we call, again, on the 'at least' in the definition and allow it to be
Thus for a central 90% confidence we require for each a the largest integer x lo and smallest x hi for which Whatever the value of a, the probability of the result falling in the belt is 90% or more. We proceed as for the Gaussian.
Coverage
This is an appropriate point to introduce coverage: the probability, given a, that the statement 'a lo ≤ a ≤ a hi ' will be true. Ideally this would be the same as the confidence level, however it may (because of the 'at least' clauses) exceed it ('overcover'); this is allowed though in principle inefficient. It should never be less ('undercover').
For example: suppose we have a Poisson process with a = 3.5 and we want a 90% central limit.
There is a probability e −3.5 =3% of getting 0 events, leading to a + = 3.0, which would be wrong as 3.0<3.5.
Continuing in sequence, there is a probability 3.5e −3.5 =11% of getting 1 event, leading to a + = 4.7, which would be right.
Right answers continue up to 7 events (with probability 3.5 7 e −3.5 /7! =4% ): this gives a safely large value for a + and a − = 3.3, which is right as 3.3<3.5, though only just, The next outcome, 8 events (probability 2%) gives a − = 4.0 which is wrong, as are all subsequent results.
Adding up the probabilities for the outcomes 1 thru 7 that give a true answer totals 94%, so there is 4% overcoverage.
Note that coverage is a function if the true value of the parameter on which limits are being placed. Values of a other than 3,5 will give different coverage numbers -though all are over 90%.
Upper Limits
The one-sided upper limit -option 4 in the list above -gives us a way of quantifying the outcome of a null experiment. 'We saw nothing (or nothing that might not have been background) so we say a ≤ a + at some confidence level.'
One simple and enlightening example occurs if you see no events, and there is no expected background. Now P (0; 2.996) = 0.05 and 2.996 ∼ 3. So if you see 0 events, you can say with 95% confidence that the true value is less than 3.0. You can then directly use this to calculate a limit on the branching fraction, cross section, or whatever you're measuring.
Bayesian 'credible intervals'
A Bayesian has no problems saying 'It will probably rain tomorrow' or 'The probability that 124.85 < M H < 125.33 GeV is 68%'. The downside, of course, is that another Bayesian can say 'It will probably not rain tomorrow' and 'The probability that 124.85 < M H < 125.33GeV is 86%' with equal validity and the two cannot resolve their subjective difference in any objective way.
A Bayesian has a prior belief pdf P (a) and defines region a R such that R P (a) da = CL. There is the same ambiguity as to choice of content (68%, 90%, 95%...) and strategy (central, symmetric, upper limit...). So Bayesian credible intervals look a lot like frequentist confidence intervals even if their meaning is different.
There are two happy coincidences.
The first is that Bayesian credible intervals on Gaussians, with a flat prior, are the same as Frequentist confidence intervals. If F quotes 68% or 95% or ... confidence intervals. and B quotes 68% or 95% or ... credible intervals. their results will agree.
The second is that although the Frequentist Poisson upper limit is given by r=r data r=0 e −a hi a r hi /r! whereas the Bayesian Poisson flat prior upper limit is given by
r data /r data ! da, integration by parts of the Bayesian formula gives a series which is same as the Frequentist limit. A Bayesian will also say : 'I see zero events -the probability is 95% the true value 3.0 or less.' This is (I think) a coincidence -it does not apply for lower limits. But it does avoid heated discussions as to which value to publish. We will look at 4 methods of handling this fix, considering as an example the observation of 3 events with expected background 3.40 and wanting to present the 95% CL upper limit on N S . The argument for doing so is that this is needed for balance: if there is really no signal, approx. half of the experiments will give positive values and half negative. If the negative results don't publish, but the positive ones do, the world average will be spuriously high. For a 95% confidence limit one accepts that 5% of the results can be wrong. This (unlikely) case is clearly one of them. So what?
A counter-argument is that if N D < N B , we know that the background has fluctuated downwards. But this cannot be incorporated into the formalism.
Anyway, the upper limit from 3 is 7.75, as 
Method 2: Go Bayesian
Assign a uniform prior to N S , for N S > 0, zero for N S < 0. The posterior is then just the like-
. The required limit is obtained from integrating
; this is illustrated in figure 27 and the value of the limit is 5.17. In principle, if you decide to work at, say, 90% confidence you may choose to use a 90% central or a 90% upper limit, and in either case the probability of the result lying in the band is at least 90%. This is shown in figure 28 .
In practice, if you happen to get a low result you would you would quote an upper limit, but if you get a high result you would quote a central limit. This, which they call 'flip-flopping', is illustrated in the plot by a break shown here for r = 10. Now the confidence belt is the green one for r < 10 and the red one for r ≥ 10. The probability of lying in the band is no longer 90%! Flip-flopping invalidates the Frequentist construction, leading to undercoverage.
They show how to avoid this. You draw the plot slightly differently: r ≡ N D is still the horizontal variable, but as the vertical variable you use N S . (This means that a different plot for any different N B , whereas the previous Poisson plot is universal, but this is not a problem.) This is to be filled using the
For each N S you define a region R such that r R P (r; N s ) ≥ 90%. You have a choice of strategy that goes beyond 'central' or 'upper limit': one plausible suggestion would be to rank r by probability and take them in order until the desired total probability content is achieved (which would, incidentally, give the shortest interval). However this has the drawback that outcomes with r << N B will have small probabilities be excluded for all N S , so that, if such a result does occur, one cannot say anything constructive, just 'This was unlikely'.
An improved form of this suggestion is that for each N S , considering each r you compare P (r; N S ) with the largest possible value obtained by varying N S . This is easier than it sounds because this highest value is either at N S = r − N B (if r ≥ N B ) or N S = 0 (if r ≤ N B ). Rank on the ratio P (r; N S )/P (r; N best S ) and again take them in order till their sum gives the desired probability. This gives a band as shown in figure 29 , which has N B = 3.4. You can see that 'flip-flopping' occurs naturally: for small values of r one just has an upper limit, whereas for larger values, above r = 7, one obtains a lower limit as well. Yet there is a single band, and the coverage is correct (i.e. it does not undercover). Is the case we are considering, r = 3, just an upper limit is given, at 4.86
Like other good ideas, this has not found universal favour. Two arguments are raised against the method.
First, that it deprives the physicist of the choice of whether to publish an upper limit or a range. It could be embarrassing if you look for something weird and are 'forced' to publish a non-zero result. But this is actually the point, and in such cases one can always explain that the limits should not be taken as implying that the quantity actually is nonzero.
Secondly, if two experiments with different N B get the same small N D , the one with the higher N B will quote a smaller limit on N S . The worse experiment gets the better result, which is clearly unfair! But this is not comparing like with like: for a 'bad' experiment with large background to get a small number of events is much less likely than it is for a 'good' low background experiment.
Method 4: CL s
This is a modification of the standard frequentist approach to include the fact, as mentioned above, that a small observed signal implies a downward fluctuation in background [20] . Denote the (strict frequentist) probability of getting a result this small (or less) from s + b events as CL s+b , and the equivalent probability from pure background as CL b . (so CL b = CL s+b for s = 0). Then introduce
Looking at figure 30 , the CL s+b curve shows that if s + b is small then the probability of getting 3 events or less is high, near 100%. As s + b increases this probability falls, and at s + b = 7.75 the probability of only getting 3 events or less is only 5%. This, after subtraction of b = 3.4, gives the strict frequentist value, The point s + b = 3.4 corresponds to s = 0, at which the probability CL b is 56% As s must be non-negative, one can argue that everything to the left of that is unmeaningful. So one attempts to incorporate this by renormalising the (blue) CL s+b curve to have a maximum of 100% in the physically sensible region, dividing it by 0.56 to get the (green) CL s curve. This is treated in the same way as the CL s+b curve, reading off the point at s + b = 8.61 where it falls to 5%. This is a limit on s + b so we subtract 3.4 to get the limit on s as 5.21. This is larger than strict frequentist limit: the method over-covers (which, as we have seen, is allowed if not encouraged) and is, in this respect 'conservative' 5 CL s is not frequentist, just 'frequentist inspired'. In terms of statistics there is perhaps little in its favour. But it has an intuitive appeal, and is widely used. Which is 'right'? Take your pick! All are correct. (Well, not wrong.). The golden rule is to say what you are doing, and if possible give the raw numbers.
Summary so far

Extension: not just counting numbers
These examples have used simple counting experiments. But a simple number does not (usually) exploit the full information.
Consider the illustration in figure 31. One is searching for (or putting an upper limit on) some broad resonance around 7 GeV. One could count the number of events inside some window (perhaps 6 to 8 GeV?) and subtract the estimated background. This might work with high statistics, as in the left, but would be pretty useless with small numbers, as in the right. It is clearly not optimal just to count an even as 'in', whether it is at 7.0 or 7.9, and to treat an 'out' of 8.1 the same as one of 10. . The confidence/probability quantities can be found from simulations, or sometimes from data. These may translate to limits on other, theory, parameters.
In the Higgs search (to take an example) the cross section depends on the mass, M H -and so does the detection efficiency, which may require changing strategy (hence different backgrounds). This leads to the need to basicaly repeat the analysis for all (of many) M H values. This can be presented in two ways.
The first is shown in figure 32 [21]. For each M H (or whatever is being studied) you search for a signal and plot the CL s (or whatever limit method you prefer) significance in a Significance Plot. Small values indicate that it is unlikely to get a signal this large just from background.
One often also plots the expected (from MC) significance, assuming the signal hypothesis is true. This is a measure of a 'good experiment'. In this case there is a discovery level drop at M H ≈ 125, which exceeds the expected significance, though not by much: ATLAS were lucky, but not incredibly lucky.
The second method is -for some reason -known as the green-and-yellow plot. This is basically the same data, but fixing CL at chosen value: in figure 33 it is 95%. You find the limit on signal strength, at this confidence level, and interpret it as a limit on the cross section σ/σ SM Again, as well as plotting the actual data one also plots the expected (from MC) limit, with variations. If there is no signal, 68% of experiments should give results in the green band, 95% in the yellow band. So this figure shows the experimental result as a black line. Around 125 GeV the 95% upper limit is more than the Standard Model prediction indicating a discovery. There are peaks between 200 and 300 GeV but they do not approach the SM value, indicating that they are just fluctuations, The value rises at 600 GeV but the green (and yellow) bands rise also, showing that the experiment is not sensitive for such high masses: basically it sees nothing but would expect to see nothing.
Making a Discovery
We now turn from setting limits, to say what you did not see, to the more exciting prospect of making a discovery.
Remembering Hypothesis testing, in claiming a discovery you have to show that your data can't be explained without it This is quantfiied by the p−value: the probability of getting a result this extreme (or worse) under the null hypothesis/Standard Model. (This is not 'The probability that the Standard Model is correct' but it seems impossible for journalists to understand the difference.) Some journals (particularly in Psychology) refuse to publish papers giving p−values. If you do lots of studies, some will have low p−values (5% below 0.05 etc). The danger is that these get published but the unsuccessful ones are binned.
Is p like the significance α? Yes and no. The formula is the same, but α is a property of the test, computed before you see the data. p is a property of the data.
Sigma language
The probability (p−value) is often translated into Gaussian-like language: the probability of a result more than 3σ from the mean is 0.27% s a p−value of 0.0027 is a '3 σ effect' (or 0.0013 depending on whether one takes the 1-tailed or 2-tailed option. Both are used.) In reporting a result with a significance of 'so many σ' there is no actual σ involved: it is just a translation to give a better feel for the size of the probability.
By convention, 3 sigma, p = 0.0013 is reported as 'Evidence for' whereas a full 5 sigma p = 0.0000003 is required for 'discovery of'.
The Look Elsewhere Effect
You may think that the requirement for 5 σ is excessively cautious. It's justification comes from history -too many 3-and 4-sigma 'signals' have gone away when more data was taken. This is partly explained by the 'Look Elsewhere Effect', How many peaks can you see in the data in figure 34? The answer is that there are none. The data us in fact purely random and flat. But the human eye is very good at seeing features.
With 100 bins, a p−value below 1% is pretty likely This can be factored in to some extent, using pseudo-experiments, but this does not allow for the sheer number of plots being produced by hardworking physicists looking for something. Hence the need for caution.
This not just ancient history. ATLAS and CMS recently observed a signal in the γγ mass around 750 GeV, with a significance of 3.9σ (ATLAS) and 3.4σ (CMS), which went away when more data was taken.
Blind Analysis
It is said 6 that when Michaelangelo was asked how he created his masterpiece sculpture 'David' he replied 'It was easy -all I did was get a block of marble and chip away everything that didn't look like David'. Such creativity may be good for sculpture but it's bad for physics. If you take your data and devise cuts to remove all the events that don't look like the signal you want to see, then whatever is left at the end will look like that signal.
Many/most analyses are now done 'blind'. Cuts are devised using Monte Carlo and/or non-signal data. You only 'open the box' once the cuts are fixed. Most collaborations have a formal procedure for doing this This may seem a tedious imposition, but we have learnt the hard way that it avoids embarrassing mistakes.
Conclusions
Statistics is a tool for doing physics. A good physicist understands their tools. Don't just follow without understanding, but read books and conference proceedings, go to seminars, talk to people, experiment with the data, and understand what you are doing. Then you will succeed. And you will have a great time!
